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Maniscalco: At the Crossroads of Environmental Laws and the Bankruptcy Code:

NOTE
AT THE CROSSROADS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE:
ABANDONMENT AND TRUSTEE
PERSONAL LIAB]LITY*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The adoption of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 1 by Congress in 1980,
coupled with the enactment of more expansive environmental legislation by state and federal governments, has amplified the present conflict between environmental laws and the Bankruptcy Code ("Code"),2
resulting in a proliferation of litigation. It is clear that these two areas
of law continue to conflict3 on both a theoretical and practical level,
causing protracted and often costly legal disputes.4

* This Note was awarded first place in the 1995 New York State Bar Association
Environmental Law Essay Contest.
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1983 &
Supp. 1993) [hereinafter CERCLA].
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988) [hereinafter Code]. All future references to the
"Code" refer to Title I of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549, codified as amended at Title 11 of the United States Code.
3. See, e.g., In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding
that the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code and state environmental laws "cannot be reconciled
where the trustee legitimately invokes his power to abandon" contaminated property of the
estate), affid sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474
U.S. 494 (1986); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 269 (3d
Cir. 1984) (noting that the policies of the Bankruptcy Code and state environmental laws
potentially conflict); In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 73 B.R. 494, 499 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1987) (The court noted that it was confronted with a "problem result[ing] from two competing governmental concerns, namely concern for debtors and concern for the environment."); In
re Distrigas Corp., 66 B.R. 382, 384 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) ("[T]wo important governmental
concerns appear to be in conflict.").
4. See William N. Hedeman et al., Superfund Transaction Costs: A Critical Perspective
on the Superfund Liability Scheme, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,413, 10,414 (1991). As Justice
O'Connor recently noted, "An entity in bankruptcy can ill afford to waste resources on litigation; every dollar spent on lawyers is a dollar creditors will never see." Pioneer Inv. Servs.
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Two important federal policies have collided at the crossroads of

environmental law and bankruptcy law. CERCLA5 evidences congressional intent that the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste should be

assessed against those responsible for creating that waste. Where the
party responsible for creating hazardous waste files for bankruptcy
protection, however, the goals of CERCLA are in direct conflict with

the policy of providing a debtor with a "fresh start"6 under the
Code.7 For example, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") is

often granted relief from the automatic stay that is triggered upon the
filing of a bankruptcy petition! The application of § 362(a) of the
Code, the automatic stay provision, to government suits to enforce
cleanup orders has generated much controversy.9 The provision is
subject to explicit exceptions for governmental actions to enforce

police or regulatory power,"° or to enforce a non-monetary judgment
in such an action or proceeding." However, although the provision's
Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 113 S. Ct. 1489, 1505 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
5. CERCLA, supra note 1, §§ 101-75, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75.
6. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934). The Supreme Court made it
clear that the "fresh start" principle is the primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Code. The
Court explained that such a policy was in the "public as well as private interest, in that it
gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which
he owns . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt." Id. at 244; see also infra note 75. But see
In re Distrigas, 66 B.R. at 384 ("An economic fresh start can only be meaningful and continue to flourish in a safe environment.").
7. See Code, supra note 2, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330.
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1993). The automatic stay operates as an injunction against
most creditor collection processes. The scope of the automatic stay will not be addressed in
this paper. However, exceptions to the automatic stay do exist. The exceptions applicable to
CERCLA proceedings are found in § 362(b)(4)-(5). Section 362(b)(4) applies to the "commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce
such governmental unit's police or regulatory power." Id. § 362(b)(4). Section 362(b)(5) excepts from the stay "the enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained
in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police
or regulatory power." Id. § 362(b)(5); see also New York v. Exxon Corp., 932 F.2d 1020,
1024 (2d Cir. 1991) (involving the city's action against the debtor under CERCLA to recover
response costs within police and regulatory power exception of automatic stay); In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 1175, 1186 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that EPA actions
requiring debtor compliance with environmental laws at hazardous waste facility exempt from
automatic stay), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); In re Hildemann Indus., 53 B.R. 509,
512 (Bankr. NJ. 1984) (holding that a state order allowing the EPA to implement remedial
actions fell within police power exception to automatic stay).
9. See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 269
(3d Cir. 1984); In re Canarico Quarries Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333, 1334 (D.P.R. 1979).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) -(1993).

11. Id. § 362(b)(5).
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legislative history plainly indicates that Congress considered a state's
enforcement of an environmental order an exercise of its "police or

regulatory power," 2 some courts have disregarded the automatic stay
and have been generous in discharging environmental claims in bank-

ruptcy proceedings. 3
Although extensive legislative histories exist both for the 1978

Bankruptcy Reform Act and the federal environmental laws,14 Congress did not consider how certain provisions of the Code might
apply in the environmental cleanup area. 5 Further, the confusion in
the case law reflects the failure of courts to reconcile the competing
policies underlying the Code and environmental enforcement statutes

with any consistency. Consequently, a major dilemma is created when
hazardous waste site owners use the Code to shield themselves from

environmental cleanup duties. On the one hand, strong policies favor
preserving the bankruptcy estate for the bankrupt's creditors and, to
some extent, for the debtor. On the other hand, strong policies favor
protecting the public health and the environment from hazardous
waste. Federal and state governments have enacted statutes furthering
both policies, however, these statutes do not effectively resolve the
conflict that arises when these policies clash. Congress's myopia with
respect to the potential intersection of these policies 6 has forced
12. The Senate Report states that "where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similarpolice or regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law," or
affects the "enforcement of an injunction," the action should not be stayed under the automatic stay. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5838 (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 343 (1978)
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6299 (identical to S. REP.).
13. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1006 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding any right
to payment, including government's claim for CERCLA response costs, was dischargeable in
bankruptcy); United States v. Whizco, Inc., 841 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding any
injunctive claim that could be construed as requiring debtor to spend money was discharge-

able).
14. For the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), see H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 377, reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787; 124 CONG. REc 32,392 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards of California
in lieu of conference report); 124 CONG. REc. 33,992 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini in
lieu of conference report). For a legislative history of CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat.
2767 (codified as amended in sections 26, 42, & 49 of U.S.C.), see H.R. REP. No. 1016,
Part 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119; H.R. REP. No. 1016, Part
11,96th Cong., 2d Sss., reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6151.
15. See, e.g., In re Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d 912, 916 (3d Cir. 1984) (discussing the
legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 554(a)), affd sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
16. See Richard I. Aaron, Bankruptcy Stays of Environmental Regulation: Harvest of
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courts to weigh the competing concerns and to resolve the conflict
with less than adequate consistency. These conflicts have generated
considerable confusion, inconsistency, and disagreement in cases and
commentary.
Assume that a debtor in bankruptcy has improperly disposed of
toxic waste on its property prior to becoming bankrupt, and has failed
to comply with a state or federal judicial or administrative order to
clean up the property.' 7 Who pays for the cleanup? There seems to
be no entirely satisfactory answer. If the debtor or trustee is required
to comply with the order, cleanup costs will come out of estate assets
otherwise available to creditors. In effect, the creditors will be paying
for the cleanup. This result may conflict with the system of priorities
in the Code, which specifies what kinds of debt are paid, and in what
order, out of the assets of the estate. That the state is not explicitly
accorded a priority for costs associated with a regulatory order, such
as environmental cleanup costs, suggests that Congress did not intend
them to be shifted to the unsecured creditors. However, if the debtor
or trustee is not required to comply with the order, the state or federal government is likely to bear the financial burden of the cleanup
via the taxpayers.' 8
The beneficial aspects of the environmental status, the complexity
of the environmental regulatory scheme, the expense of compliance
with the environmental statutes, and the severity of liabilities for noncompliance have all contributed to a substantial body of bankruptcy
case law. Federal courts have had to interpret the Code in connection
with a variety of environmental issues. Some of these issues include:
whether a bankruptcy trustee can abandon property from a bankruptcy
estate; who should pay for the cleanup of contaminated property; and
whether a bankruptcy trustee can be held personally liable for the
cleanup of contaminated property. This Note will review the case law
related to the foregoing issues.
When a conflict arises between the Code and other federal statutes, the proper approach to the resolution of the conflict is not clear.
In general, courts try to construe apparently conflicting statutes so

Commercial Timber as an Introduction to a Clash of Policies, 12 ENVTL. L. 1, 1-2 (1981).
17. See CERCLA, supra note 1, § 106, 42 U.S.C. §9606, for federal cleanup orders
and New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985), for state cleanup orders.

18. If the federal government pays for the cleanup, funds will be taken from Superfund,
consisting largely of money paid by polluting industries. See infra note 36. If the state bears
the burden of cleanup, costs will effectively come from the public (taxpayers).
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that both provisions will stand, 9 avoiding a construction that might
impair the operation of other laws Congress probably did not intend
to repeal.a Thus, to carry out the will of Congress, courts examine
the statutory schemes and their underlying policies as a whole.2
When a bankruptcy law arguably conflicts with another statute, however, the courts will give effect to a more specific provision over a
more general one,' and then to the more recent statute if the conflict is otherwise irreconcilable.' Most importantly, in any conflict
resolution, courts must interpret the statutes in light of the original
purpose that prompted Congress to legislate.24
This Note will focus primarily on the interplay between two
federal statutes, CERCLAs and the Code.' First, this Note will
briefly examine both the bankruptcy process and the environmental
process. After addressing the history of abandonment, this Note will
focus on the language and effect of § 554 of the Code (the trustee's
power to abandon). This Note will then explore Midlantic National
Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection27 emphasizing the opinion elaborated in Justice Rehnquist's dissent. It will
further examine the abandonment power in light of Midlantic. The
primary focus will be to examine the principal bankruptcy issues encountered by a trustee who must administer an estate which has potential CERCLA liability. Despite the Midlantic decision, does a trustee still have the power to abandon a contaminated site? After exhausting Midlantic's holding, this Note will focus on subsequent
decisions and exceptions which have evolved from Midlantic. Finally,
this Note will examine those situations where a bankruptcy trustee
could be held personally liable in a bankruptcy proceeding involving
assets of a debtor which are contaminated by hazardous waste.

19. United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1877).
20. Mills v. Scott, 99 U.S. 25, 28 (1878); see also Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 26667 (1981).
21. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974).
22. Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980).
23. See Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503-04 (1936) (holding that, although disfavored, an implied repeal will be found if the conflict is sufficiently direct).
24. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979); see also In re

Law, 37 B.R. 501, 511 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) (stating that courts must give effect to
legislative intent).
25. CERCLA, supra note 1, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75.
26. Code, supra note 2, 11 U.S.C §§ 101-1330.
27. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494
(1986).
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II. THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESS
CERCLA was enacted by Congress in response to the environmental and public health hazards posed by improper disposal of hazardous waste.' While the earlier Resource Conservation and Recov-

ery Act ("RCRA"), 29 provides "cradle to grave regulation of hazardous substances" in operating facilities, CERCLA provides for the
cleanup of inactive or abandoned hazardous waste sites.3" Passed in
the eleventh hour as a compromise bill, CERCLA suffers from poor
drafting, inconsistent provisions and vague terminology.3t The pauci-

ty of useful legislative history further complicates the task of inter-

preting the statute. 2? Nevertheless, the overall structure of the statute

is clear. Section 104 of CERCLA33 authorizes the government, under

the auspices of the EPA,34 to clean up hazardous waste sites3" using

28. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 575 (D. Md.
1986); S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980), U.S.C.C.A.N. 1980, 6119, reprinted
in A Legislative History of The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980, 305 (1983); CERCLA was enacted in response to "the tragic consequences of improper[l, negligent[i] and reckless[I] hazardous waste disposal practices known as
the 'inactive hazardous waste site problem."' H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1,
at 1, 17-18 (1980) reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119-20.
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-39e (1988 & Supp. V. 1993). The RCRA is codified as Subchapter Ell of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (1988 & Supp. V
1993). It primarily focuses on the management and regulation of hazardous waste disposal.
See HR. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., -2d Sess. 2-4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6339-42.
30. See Scott Wilsdon, Book Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims
Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 1261, 1263 n.16 (1987); see
also Arlene E. Minsky et al., The Interface Between Bankruptcy and Environmental Laws, 46
Bus. LAw 623, app. A at 673 (1991) ("CERCLA is not a 'regulatory statute.' It is left to
other statutes, such as [the RCRA] to serve the prospective goal of prevention.").
31. Wilsdon, supra note 30, at 1263 n.17. One court surmised that the statute's drafting
was "a hastily drawn piece of compromise legislation, marred by vague terminology and
deleted provisions" which, almost invariably, places courts in the "undesirable and onerous
position of construing inadequately drawn legislation." United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 838-39 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984), modified, 810 F.2d
726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); see also Maryland Bank & Trust
Co., 632 F. Supp. at 578 (finding that "the structure of section 107(a), like so much of this
hastily patched together compromise Act, is not a model of statutory clarity").
32. For a thorough explanation of CERCLA's history see generally Frank P. Grad, A
Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLuM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 1-2 (1982).
33. CERCLA, supra note 1, § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
34. Exec. Order No. 12,580, 3 C.F.R. § 12.3.1(g) 193 (1988), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9615 (1988); reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (Supp. V 1993).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988). CERCLA provides for two types of responses: a
removal action is a short-term response to an emergency (usually a spill or a leaking site)
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the Superfund36 and then to seek cost reimbursement
from potentially
3
37
responsible parties ("PRP's") pursuant to § 107. 1
CERCLA holds four groups of "persons ' 39 liable for the costs
incurred by the government in responding to an environmental hazard:

(1) present owners and operators of a "facility" where hazardous
substances are located; (2) any person who owned or operated the
facility at the time of the disposal of "hazardous substances"; (3) any

person who generated hazardous waste or arranged for the transport
or disposal of hazardous waste; and (4) any person who accepted

hazardous substances for transport to a treatment facility or disposal
site.' This liability structure enables the government to impose retroactive,4' strict,42 and joint and several43 liability on located potenand involves temporary measures to contain dangers to the public health and environment. A
remedial action is a more permanent response to prevent or minimize present or future harm
to the public health or environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988); FREDERICK R. ANDERSON
Er AL., ENViRONmENTAL PROTECTON: LAW AND POLICY 615 (2d ed. 1990).
36. See Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 221, 94 Stat. 2801 (1980), redesignated by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 [hereinafter SARA], Pub. L. No. 99499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of Title 42 of the United States
Code). Congress renamed the Hazardous Substance Trust Fund the Hazardous Substance
Superfund in 1986, authorized $8.5 billion for five years, and transferred it to the Internal
Revenue Code because the fund was found to be inadequate, as originally enacted in 1980,
to achieve the goals of CERCLA. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 38,
48-54 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2988, 2998-3004. The current Superfund is
funded by environmental taxes, monies recovered from CERCLA violators, monies received
from violators of the Clean Water Act, and by monies appropriated by the U.S. Treasury. 42
U.S.C. § 9607 (1988); see also FREDERICK R. ANDERSON Er AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW AND POLICY 573 (1984) ("Superfund covers cleanup costs if the site has been
abandoned, if the responsible parties elude detection, or if private resources are inadequate:);
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1985). Any remediation of a
Superfund site must satisfy minimum cleanup standards and procedures as set forth in the
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. See 40 C.F.R. 300
(1988). Individual 9tates may enact similar laws implementing the federal CERCLA framework. See 42 U.S.C. § 9614 (1988) (articulating that the states are not preempted from imposing additional liability for release of hazardous substances).
37. PRP is a term of art not defined under CERCLA but used to cover the four categories of parties listed in § 107(a)(1)-(4). The policy underlying CERCLA is to place the ultimate responsibility for cleanup on "those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of
chemical poison:' Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081
(1st Cir. 1986); see also Florida Power & Light Co., v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d
1313, 1317 (lth Cir. 1990); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373,
1377 (8th Cir. 1989).
38. CERCLA, supra note 1, § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
39. The term "person" means an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership,
consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality,
commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body. CERCLA, supra note 1,
42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
40. CERCLA, supra note 1, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173-74 (4th Cir. 1988)
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tially responsible parties,' allowing the government to either recover
the agency's response costs4' or force a PRP to fund the corrective
action.' Moreover, liability will still attach even when a PRP's nex-

(holding that CERCLA's retroactivity is consistent with due process), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1106 (1989). Retroactive liability means that if a company contributed waste to a site before
Superfund's enactment in 1980 it can be held liable for cleanup, even though its actions may
not have been illegal at the time of disposal. Daniel M. Abuhoff et al., Superfund Reform
Now Rests in Hands of GOP, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 5, 1994, at CIO.
42. Although no provision explicitly imposing strict liability exists in CERCLA, "[i]t is
now well settled that each of the four groups of responsible parties [under CERCLA] is
strictly liable." EPA Draft Proposal Defining Lender Liability Issues Under the Secured Creditor Exemption of CERCLA reprinted in 55 Banking L. Rep. (BNA) 636, 636 (Oct. 15,
1990); see In re T.P. Long Chem., 45 B.R. 278, 282 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) ("The liability
imposed by section 107(a) of CERCLA is strict liability"); George Pendygraft et al., Who
Pays for Environmental Damage: Recent Developments in CERCLA Liability and Insurance
Coverage Litigation, 21 IND. L. REV. 117, 122-23 (1988) (noting that "[c]ourts have unanimously concluded that the standard of liability imposed under [CERCLA] is strict liability");
see also Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 167 ("We agree with the overwhelming body of precedent
that has interpreted [CERCLA] section 107(a) as establishing a strict liability scheme."); New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that "Congress
intended to impose a strict liability standard subject only to the affirmative defenses listed in
section 107(b)"); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (D.N.J. 1983) (citation
omitted).
43. Recently, the courts of appeals in the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits have addressed the scope of joint and several liability under CERCLA. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889 (5th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d. Cir. 1990). Joint and
several liability means each PRP is liable for all cleanup costs at a site, unless the PRP can
show that the environmental injury is divisible and there is a reasonable basis to divide the
harm. But see United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
(showing reluctance to limit PRP's joint and several liability and concluding that it was "simply impossible to determine which defendants' waste contributed in what specific manner to
the releases and continuing threat of further releases"). However, it is important to note that
the Supreme Court has yet to confirm joint and several CERCLA liability. See ANDERSON,
supra note 35, at 634.
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607 (1988). Section 9607(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, . . . shall be liable
for(4) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State...
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Section 9601(9) defines a "facility" as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline . . . well, pit,
pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling
stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located(.]
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (emphasis added); see supra note 37.
45. CERCLA, supra note 1, § 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9612(c).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9606. CERCLA's liability structure often leads to increased litigation.
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us with a site is minimal. Hence, the government need make only a
rudimentary prima facie case. Consequently, liability under § 107(a)
will be satisfied if the government merely shows: (1) the site is a

"facility";47 (2) a "release"'

or "threatened release" of any "hazard-

ous substance"49 from the site has occurred; (3) the release or threatened release has caused the United States to incur "response costs";"
and (4) the defendant is one of the persons designated as a party
liable for costs.5' In addition, the EPA may procure an injunction ordering a PRP to clean up the site and/or cease its contaminating

activity.52
HI. THE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS

A debtor53 in financial difficulty has various options under the
federal bankruptcy laws. One is to liquidate its assets, usually under
chapter 7 of the Code, 4 and repay as many debts as possible with
the proceeds of the estate. The other option, under chapter 11 of the
Code, is to restructure its debt, remain in business, and attempt to
repay a portion of the debt over an extended period of time.55 For
the most part, corporations reorganize under chapter 11 of the Code,
however, individuals can reorganize under either chapter 11 or chapter
B." Whichever form of relief is pursued, the bankruptcy process
commences when a bankruptcy petition is filed either by the debtor

PRP's sue one another to force contribution for the costs associated with a cleanup. "This
protracted litigation impedes the progress of remediation efforts. Thus, CERCLA has frustrated
both the business community, which perceives the law as unfair, and environmentalists who
want to curtail the litigation that slows cleanup." Abuhoff et al., supra note 41, at CIO.
47. CERCLA, supra note 1, § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9); see supra note 44.
48. CERCLA, supra note 1, § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
49. CERCLA, supra note 1, § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
50. CERCLA, supra note 1, § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).
51. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md.
1986).
52. CERCLA, supra note 1, § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). This Note will not explore
the equitable remedies and their treatment available under CERCLA.
53. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(13), 109 (1993). The provisions of the Code dealing with
individual debtors will not be addressed because generally only corporate or commercial debtors own or operate polluted or contaminated property. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-30. But see
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
54. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66. A debtor can also file a liquidating plan under chapter 11
of the Code.
55. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-73 (1993).
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1993). Family farmers reorganize under chapter 12, enacted
late in 1986. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(f) (1993).
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voluntarily,57 or by the debtor's creditors. 8 Once the court accepts
the petition, a trustee is appointed to oversee the debtor's estate. 59

The date of the filing is of vital importance. First, it triggers the
"automatic stay," which immediately halts all creditor collection activity.' Second, it determines what claims against the debtor and what
assets of the debtor will be administered in the bankruptcy.6 Generally, pre-petition assets become part of the bankrupt estate,62 while

post-petition assets do not.63 Similarly, pre-petition claims are handled in the bankruptcy proceeding, but post-petition claims are not."
Upon commencement of a bankruptcy petition, a new legal entity
comes into existence, the debtor's estate, and this new entity is wholly separate and distinct from the debtor.65 The debtor is simply the
person (or municipality) concerning whom a bankruptcy case has been
commenced.' The estate is the aggregate of certain properties in
which the debtor had an interest at the time the bankruptcy case commenced.67 Thus, the assets of the debtor are placed into the bank-

ruptcy estate.' The estate consists of all property (less certain specifically excepted property) in which the debtor had any interest at the

57. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1993) (voluntary petition).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1993) (involuntary filing).
59. In a chapter 7 proceeding, an interim trustee must be appointed when a petition for
relief is filed. 11 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1993). It is the duty of the Office of the United States
Trustee to elect a trustee from the members on its panel of trustees. The interim trustee
serves only until a regular trustee is appointed. Id. § 701(a)(2)(b). Once a regular trustee is
appointed the trustee will take possession of the debtor's assets, which comprise the bankruptcy estate. Id. § 704(1). It should be recognized that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994
abrogates the United States Trustee's powers in appointing a trustee in chapter 11 proceedings, thereby bringing the trustee election process back to the old system under the Act. See
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994) (to be codified as
amended in scattered sections of Title 11, 18 and 28 of United States Code) [hereinafter Reform Act, 1994]. However, this Note will not address the process of electing a trustee in
chapter 11 proceedings.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1993); see also supra note 8.

61. Id. § 541.
62. Id.
63. Md § 541(a). However, some post-petition assets may become part of the estate if
they have some significant relationship to the pre-petition assets. See id. § 541(a)(5).
64. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 508 (1993). Some post-petition claims are treated as administrative expenses and given first priority in bankruptcy. Administrative expenses are those
necessary to the preservation of the estate, such as post-petition wages, insurance premiums,
and the like.
65. Id. § 541(a).
66. Id. § 101(13).
67. Id.§ 541.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1993).
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commencement of the case. 69 Therefore, the moment the debtor's
estate is created through the commencement of the bankruptcy pro-

ceeding, the debtor is legally stripped of its interests in all property
which becomes part of the estate." Upon appointment of a bankrupt-

cy trustee, the trustee becomes the representative of the estate, rather
than the debtor." Moreover, if assets of the estate are too burdensome or of inconsequential value to the estate, the trustee may aban-

don them.' Abandoned property will revert back to any person or
entity, including the debtor, who has a possessory interest in it r

A chapter 7 liquidation entails both the conversion into cash of
all of the debtor's assets not exempted by the Code and the distribution of such proceeds to creditors.74 However, the underlying purposes of the Code are to provide the bankruptcy debtor with a "fresh
start''"S and to facilitate the dispensation of the creditors' claims
against the debtor.7 6 In addition, the Code is designed to provide the
debtor with relief from and eventual discharge of its debts, thus allowing the debtor to begin anew At the same time, by expediting

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. § 323(a).
72. Id. § 554. A full analysis off the trustee's power to abandon property is discussed,
infra part IV.
73. See In re Cruseturner, 8 B.R. 581, 590-92 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981); see also infra
notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
74. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (1993). Exemptions under the Code are dealt with in § 522.
Id. § 522. These exemptions are designed for the individual or chapter 13 debtor, and are
not relevant to a debtor facing environmental liability. Id.
75. Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913). However, the present Bankruptcy
Code enacted in 1978, does not allow the debts of "non individuals"--corporations and partnerships--to be discharged under chapter 7 of the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1993) ("The
court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless . . . the debtor is not an individual.') Thus,
for corporate debtors, the fresh start purpose of chapter 7 has been rescinded. In re Quanta
Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 915 n.7 (3d Cir. 1984) affd sub nom. Midiantic Nat'l Bank
v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986); see also Stephen B. Kong, A
Chapter 7 Trustee's Abandonment of Environmentally-Impaired Property: Midlantic, PostMidlantic Interpretation and the Plague of Results-Oriented Legal Analysis, 5 FORDHAM
ENVTL. LJ. 231 (1993) ("[T]he only thing left in the end is a worthless corporate carcass.");
Leonard J. Long, Burdensome Property, Onerous Laws, and Abandonment: Revisiting
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 21 HoFSTRA
L. REV. 63, 106-07 (1992) (recognizing that once chapter 7 liquidations are complete, the
corporate debtor ceases to exist, therefore, "[a] non-entity cannot be held liable for the cost
of an environmental cleanup'.
76. Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224 (1930). "The broad purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to bring about equitable distribution of the bankrupt's estate among creditors
holding just demands...
' Id. at 227.
77. See Burlingham, 228 U.S. at 473.
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the collection and liquidation of the debtor's assets, the Code seeks to

maximize the amount of the debtor's estate available for creditors,
before final discharge of their claims.78
A bankruptcy trustee obtains certain powers, duties, and obligations under the Code which it is required to carry out. 79 Under
§ 323, a trustee is the "representative of the estate," and "has the capacity to sue or be sued."8 Additionally, § 363 authorizes the trustee to "use, sell, or lease" property of the estate.8' Under chapter 7,

the main duty of a trustee is to "collect and reduce to money the
property of the estate for which such trustee serves, and close such

estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of the
parties in interest."' Accordingly, a chapter 7 trustee's actions are
carried out with the intent of collecting, liquidating, and distributing
as much of the debtor's property to creditors as possible. 3

IV. ABANDONMENT
Historically, the principal rationale for bankruptcy abandonment
has been the notion that the creditors of the debtor would be better
off if the individual charged with administering the bankruptcy estate

for the creditors' benefit (ie., the bankruptcy trustee) did not have to
administer those properties which tended either to decrease the aggregate value of the estate or add no real value to the estate.84 General-

78. Kothe, 280 U.S. at 227.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 323 (1993).
80. Id. Under the Code, the trustee does not technically hold title to the property of the
estate, but nonetheless has "certain powers associated with ownership." In re T.P. Long
Chem., 45 B.R. 278, 283 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); see also infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1993). Essentially, section 363 gives the trustee the ability to
run the debtors business as may be necessary in the course of the bankruptcy proceeding.
"Mhe Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide ranging management authority over the debtor." Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352 (1985).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 704(1) (1993). In addition, § 704 enumerates eight other duties of a
trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding. See id.
83. See Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930); In re Quanta Resources
Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The purpose of a liquidation proceeding under
Chapter 7 . . . is to provide a fair distribution of the debtor's assets among the creditors.... "), affld sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envt. Protection,
474 U.S. 494 (1986). To the extent necessary to carry out the liquidation, a chapter 7 trustee
has the limited power to operate the debtor's business, but such power must first be authorized by the bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C. § 721 (1993).
84. See Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 508, (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
By analogy to the trustee's statutory power to reject executory contracts, courts had
developed a rule permitting the trustee to abandon property that was worthless or
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ly, when a trustee abandons property, it is usually abandoned to the
debtor as if the bankruptcy case never commenced. 5 However, if
someone other than the debtor has a possessory interest in the property the trustee may abandon to that person.86 Moreover, several courts
have held that unless the property is concealed from the trustee or is
unscheduled, abandonment by the trustee is final and irrevocable.'
The concept of abandonment means simply that the property abandoned will not be administered as part of the bankrupt estate.8
A. The History of Abandonment
At the turn of the century, it was generally accepted that aban-

donment of burdensome property was simply a logical extension of
the trustee's common law power to reject executory contracts, and

not expected to sell for a price sufficiently- in excess of the encumbrances to offset
the cost of administration. ...
This judge-made rule served the overriding purpose
of bankruptcy liquidation: the expeditious reduction of the debtor's property to
money, for equitable distribution to creditors... . Forcing the trustee to administer

burdensome property would contradict the purpose, slowing the administration of
the estate and draining its assets.

Id. (citations omitted).
85. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1993); In re Tarpley, 4 B.R. 145 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1980) (holding that although abandonment removes property from the estate, the automatic
stay may continue to protect it); BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY
LAW MANUAL 1H1.09[2], 1.09[3] (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter WENTRAUB & RESNICK]. But
see In re Pierce, 29 B.R. 612 (E.D.N.C. 1983) (under local procedures in that district, abandoned property no longer subject to automatic stay).
86. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 368 (1977) (emphasizing that
"abandonment may be to any party with a possessory interest in the property abandoned").
Although Congress amended section 554(c) of the Code in 1984 to emphasize that unadministered property is abandoned "to the debtor," the subsection continues to provide "unless the
court orders otherwise." Id.; see also In re Butler, 51 B.R. 261 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1984);
WNENTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 85, at I 4.06.
87. See, e.g., In re Brio Ref., 86 B.R. 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (holding the abandonment of property irrevocable even after it was discovered that the property was potentially
hazardous); In re Womell, 70 B.R. 153 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (abandonment of real estate
held irrevocable regardless of later discovery that property had greater value); In re Burch
Co., Inc., 37 B.R. 273 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1983). But see In re Lintz W. Side Lumber, 655 F.2d
786 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Alt, 39 B.R. 902 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984) (abandonment revoked
if trustee overlooked available information when making abandonment decision and then
sought to correct mistake).
88. This concept obviously seems attractive to the debtor in bankruptcy who holds title
to contaminated property. If the debtor can abandon the contaminated property it will not be
included in the bankrupt estate and the debtor will only be required to fund environmental
compliance to the extent the debtor owns assets separate from the bankruptcy estate. If the
debtor does not have assets separate from the estate sufficient to pay the cost of cleanup, the
abandoned property will sit until the taxpayers pay for the needed environmental remediation.
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therefore, should be authorized. Yet, within the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 ("ACT"), ° no relevant provision specifically addressed this
abandonment threshold. 91 Nonetheless, courts began to recognize the
trustee's abandonment desires by creating "an implicit realization to
abandonment,"'

thus "serv[ing] the overriding purpose of bankruptcy

liquidation: the expeditious reduction of the debtor's property to money, for equitable distribution to creditors."'93
Under the Act, abandoned property would be conveyed back to
the debtor, as if no bankruptcy action had been filed.94 This analysis

appears to be consistent with the current state of the law.'

Aban-

89. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcy, 1 554.01 at 554-2 (L. King et al. 15th ed. 1993)
[hereinafter COLLIER]; see also Kong, supra note 75 at 221 (addressing trustee's abandonment
power).
90. Pub. L. No. 55-541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) [hereinafter "ACT"].
91. 4 COLLIER, ( 554.01 at 554-1 n.1 (describing §§ 64a(4), 70a(2) & 70b of ACT).
92. Paula T. Perkins, Comment, Abandonment in the Face of Possible Toxic Contamination: What's a Lender to Do?, 44 Sw. LJ. 1563, 1564 (1991) (citing First Nat'l Bank v.
Lasater, 196 U.S. 115, 118 (1905); Dushane v. Beall, 161 U.S. 513, 515 (1896); American
File Co. v. Garrett 110 U.S. 288, 295 (1884); Gochenour v. Cleveland Terminals Bldg. Co.,
118 F.2d 89, 94 (6th Cir. 1941); Federal Land Bank v. Nalder, 116 F.2d 1004, 1007 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 578 (1941); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan, 92 F.2d 28, 31
(5th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 636 (1938); Central States Life Ins. Co. v. Koplar
Co., 80 F.2d 754, 757-58 (8th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 687 (1936); Lincoln Nat'l
Life Ins. Co. v. Scales, 62 F.2d 582, 585 (5th Cir. 1933); Quinn v. Gardner, 32 F.2d 772,
773 (8th Cir. 1929). But see infra note 131 (discussing three pre-code cases).
93. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 508
(1986) (citing Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930)).
94. Abandonment does not completely terminate the automatic stay; it only terminates
the stay with respect to the trustee's or the estate's interest in the property. Consequently,
although the debtor is revested with the property, the creditors may not pursue their nonbankruptcy remedies without first obtaining permission from the court through relief from the
automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1993). Moreover, when a trustee abandons property of the
estate, "any encumbrances against the property (security interests, mortgage liens, tax liens,
judgment liens, etc.) continue to encumber the property." Long, supra note 75, at 93. Effectively, the trustee's abandonment "does not itself function to extinguish any non bankruptcy
rights or obligations the debtor has with respect to [the] . . . property." Id. at 93-94.
95. The court in In re Cruseturner, 8 B.R. 581, 59-92 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) stated:
Subsection (b), enacted as Section 554(c), was changed in the final draft by deleting references originally made which stated that abandonment under this section
would be made specifically to the debtor. Thus, it appears that abandonment under
any subsection of 554 will be to a party with a "possessory interest." Generally, a
"possessory interest!' is defined as a "right to exert control over" or a "right to
possess" property "to the exclusion of others." This legislative reference and attendant definition are in keeping with cases under former law which hold that title
and right to the property reverts to its pre-bankruptcy status. Thus, whoever had
the possessory right to the property at the filing of bankruptcy again reacquires
that right. Normally this party is the debtor, but it is conceivable that a creditor
[or the EPA] may be entitled to possession instead if, by the exercise of its con-
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donment under § 554 of the Code divests the estate of control of
the property and usually returns it to the debtor,' along with all prepetition rights and obligations." The debtor is then treated as having
owned the property without interruption. Essentially, title is regarded
as belonging to the bankrupt debtor just as if he had never been in
bankruptcy, and stands as it did before filing."
B. Statutory Language
The language of § 554 of the -Code is couched in unconditional
terms: "After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any
property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate. '""t° The statute, on its
face, suggests that a determination that property is burdensome or of
inconsequential value is sufficient grounds for abandonment, and that
no balancing or weighing of additional factors is necessary."0 1 Fur-

tractual or other rights, it held a possessory interest prior to the filing of
the bankruptcy.
Id.; see also Dewsnup v. Timm, 87 B.R. 676 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988) (following Cruseturner
court's analysis of § 554).
96. Prior to 1978 the trustee took legal title to the estate property. Under 11 U.S.C.
§ 541 the trustee no longer takes legal title to the property, but only controls it. See 4 COLLiER, supra note 89, I 554.02[2]. One commentator recognized that bankruptcy courts are
unwilling to say that actual title is transferred or even affected by the process of abandonment. For these courts, abandonment is not regarded as the "divesting and revesting of title
to property." See Long, supra note 75, at 91-92 n.83. Instead, "it is now viewed as a divesting and revesting of control over on the property." Id.; see also In re R-B-Co. of Bossier, 59 B.R. 43, 45 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) ("The Court does not believe that abandonment
can be used, as a means of effecting a transfer of title .... Under section 554, upon abandonment, the trustee or debtor-in-possession is simply divested of control of the property
because it is no longer property of the estate:') (quoted in Long). But see In re Ark Indus.
Inc. 122 B.R. 43 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) (holding trustee cannot abandon property to anyone
but debtor because bankruptcy court cannot convey title to real property in abandonment
proceeding); First Carolina Fin. Corp. v. Caron, 50 B.R. 27 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984) (§ 554
abandonment may not determine issue of ownership and possession of property).
97. See supra notes 86, 94-95 and accompanying text.
98. Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Perry, 29 B.R. 787, 793 (Bankr. D.Md. 1983), affd, 729 F.2d
982 (4th Cir. 1984); Bennett v. Commercial Credit Plan, 13 B.R. 643, 645 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1981); Cruseturner, 8 B.R. at 590.
99. See Mason v. Comm'r, 646 F.2d 1309, 1310 (9th Cit. 1980); 4 COLLMR, supra
note 89, I 554.01.
100. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1993).
101. As Justice Rehnquist reasoned:
This language, absolute in its terms, suggests that a trustee's power to abandon is
limited only by consideration of the property's value to the estate. It makes no
mention of other factors to be balanced or weighed and permits no easy inference
that Congress was concerned about state environmental regulations.
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thermore, nothing in the House and Senate Reports of the provision

provides any indication that Congress intended to limit a trustee's
statutory authority to abandon if abandonment adversely affects state
police and regulatory powers."°2 Some commentators have argued

that the clear language of § 554(a), coupled with the lack of legislative history seems to indicate only one result:

3

"the trustee's cost-

benefit analysis should be the sole consideration in abandonment decisions."' 4 Effectively, if the property is deemed burdensome or of
inconsequential value to the estate resulting in a detriment to the
unsecured creditors, the property should be abandoned by the trustee. 5 However, it is apparent that Congress did not anticipate the

conflict between § 554 and both state and federal environmental laws.
C. Congress Did Not Intend to Limit Section 554
The legislative history of this statute does not reveal a congressional intent to incorporate judge-made exceptions to abandon-

ment."° The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress
Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 509 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102. The legislative history is sparse and unhelpful. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 377, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6333; S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 92, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5878; 124 CONG. REc. Hll,098
(Sept. 28, 1978).
103. See, e.g., Joseph L. Cosetti & Jeffrey M. Friedman, Midlantic National Bank,
Kovacs and Penn Terra: The Bankruptcy Code and State Environmental Law-Perceived Conflicts and Options for the Trustee and State Environmental Agencies, 7 J.L. & COM. 65, 75
(1987) [hereinafter Cosetti & Friedman]. Cosetti and Friedman noted:
Prior to Midlantic and Quanta Resources, the two well-recognized bankruptcy treatises, "Norton Bankruptcy Law & Practice" and "Collier on Bankruptcy," do not
mention any public health and safety exception to abandonment under section
554(a) that is based on state law. Professor Norton notes that "[t]he best interests
of the estate and not the interests of the debtor and creditors will determine whether property should be abandoned."
Id. (quoting 2 NORTON, 39.01 (1984)); see also Kong, supra note 75, at 228; Midlantic, 474
U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104. Kong, supra note 75, at 228; see also Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 513 ("[T]he relevant
inquiry at an abandonment hearing [is] to be limited to whether the property is burdensome
and of inconsequential value to the estate.") (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
105. See Perkins; supra note 92, at 1563 n.1 ("Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor Bankruptcy Rule 6007 places a time limitation on the trustee [for abandonment]. Under the precode rule, however, the trustee had to abandon within a reasonable time."); see also Kong,
supra note 75; D. Ethan Jeffrey, Comment, Personal Liability of a Bankruptcy Trustee Since
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection: the Environmental Law and the Bankruptcy Code Conflict Threatens to Engulf Bankruptcy Trustees, 2
VILL. ENVTL. LJ. 403 (1991).
106. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 377, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially

created concept, it makes that intent specific."° Thus, had Congress
intended to restrict a trustee's abandonment power in § 554(a), it

could have provided for express exceptions.'

For example, unlike

§ 554, the automatic stay section contains specific exceptions which

limit its applicability.1" Similarly, § 1170(a)(2) of the Code provides an express exception which limits abandonment." ° Indeed,
§ 554(a) is among the few provisions of the Code that do not provide

explicit exceptions."' The lack of such exceptions in § 554(a) implies that Congress did not intend to limit the section's operation."'
V. MIDLANTIC NATIONAL BANK V. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

In 1986 the Supreme Court was faced with the question of
whether the judicially developed doctrine of abandonment that protected certain state and federal interests was incorporated into the codification of the abandonment power through § 554 of the Bankruptcy
Code."' The Supreme Court's decision in Midlantic evidences the
conflict encountered by the courts between the Code and state and
federal environmental laws.
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
("NJDEP") had ordered Quanta Resources, Corp. (the debtor), a processor of waste oil with facilities in New York and New Jersey, to
cease operation at the New Jersey site, after more than 400,000 gal-

6333; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5878.
107. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-267 (1979);
see also Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904) (stating that "the intention would be
clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable considerations of convenience in administering the estate of the bankrupt').
108. Cf. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984). Congress knows how to
draft an exclusion when it so desires, and its failure to do so indicates that Congress did not
intend to provide for one. Id. at 522-23; see also Richard B. Paige, In re Quanta Resources
Corp.: Bankruptcy Policy v. Environmental Interests; A Polluted Judicial Theory, 59 AM.

BANKR. L.J. 357, 365 (1985).
109. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
110. Section 1170 of the Code provides that "[t]he court, after notice and a hearing, may
authorize the abandonment of all or a portion of a railroad line if such abandonment is ...
(2) consistent with the public interest." 11 U.S.C. § 1170(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
111. See Norman L Silber, Note, Cleaning up in Bankruptcy: Curbing Abuse of the Federal Bankruptcy by Industrial Polluters, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 870, 883 (1985).

112. See Midiantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
510 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
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Ions of PCB-contaminated waste oil were discovered." 4 As a result,
Quanta filed a chapter 11 petition (subsequently converted to chapter
7) in New Jersey.'
Subsequent to the bankruptcy filing in New
Jersey, however, 70,000 gallons of contaminated oil were discovered

at the New York facility." 6 After an unsuccessful attempt to sell the
property, the trustee notified the Bankruptcy Court in New Jersey of
his intention to abandon the property."' New York objected to
abandonment, arguing that it would threaten the public's health and
safety in violation of state and federal environmental laws."' Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Court allowed abandonment, reasoning that
New York was better able to protect the public from any possible
danger or harm than either the trustee or the debtor."9 Shortly
thereafter, the trustee moved to abandon the New Jersey property,
which was also approved by the Bankruptcy Court.' This decision
and the earlier District Court decision were appealed directly to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which reversed

the lower courts, holding that a bankruptcy trustee did not have the
power under the Code to abandon property of a bankruptcy estate in

contravention of state environmental protection laws.''
The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that, before the passage of
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, any power a trustee had to abandon property was given to him by the courts.Y Through the enactment of

114. Id. at 497.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 498. New York based its argument on § 959(b) of the Judiciary Code, 28
U.S.C. § 959(b), which requires in pertinent part
(b) [A] trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any cause pending in any court
of the United States ....
shall manage and operate the property in his possession
as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid
laws of the State in which such property is situated ...
Id.
Threats to the public included the removal of a 24-hour guard set up by the trustee
to prevent vandalism and public entry, a shut down of the emergency fire system, unsealed
deteriorating tanks of PCB-contaminated waste oil and explosives on the premises. See
Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 498-99.
119. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 498. The District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. Id.
120. Id.
121. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984). The court also found
that the pre-Code exceptions to abandonment had been codified in § 554 through the passage
of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 918.
122. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 500.
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§ 554 of the Code in 1978, the Court determined that Congress had
intended to codify this judge-made power." The Court posited that
since there were well recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power and no such specific intent in the legislative history existed, "Congress ... presumably included the established corollary

that a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation
of certain state and federal laws."'"4 The Court's reasoning was sat-

isfied by looking to the normal rule of statutory construction, that "if
Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a

judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific."' 25
" Additionally, the Court determined that if Congress intended to grant a trustee
an exception from non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be
clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of the bank-

rupt."' 6 Accordingly, the Court held that "a trustee may not abandon property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that is

reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from identifiable hazards."' 27
In a stinging dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White and O'Connor, criticized the majority's

123. The Court made this determination by looking to the Third Circuit's analysis of this
judge-made law. The Third Circuit held that the pre-Code abandonment power was limited by
state police powers protecting the public interest: "Where important state law or general equitable principles protect some public interest they should not be overridden by federal legislation unless they are inconsistent with explicit congressional intent such that the supremacy
clause mandates their suppression by the abandonment power." Quanta, 739 F.2d at 918.
124. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 501. Other evidence presented by the Court to support its
position included: (1) the legislative history of § 362, which provides an exception to automatic stay for governmental units to enforce its police power, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5)
(1993); (2) looking to 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1993), which provides that a trustee must operate
property in his possession pursuant to valid state law; (3) the judge-made law restricting a
trustee's abandonment power established through three pre-Code cases, see infra note 131.
125. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 501 (citing Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
443 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1979)).
126. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 501 (quoting Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904));
see also Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 85 (1939) ("If this old and familiar power of
the states [over local railroad service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district courts the
powers over railroads, we ought to find language fitting for so drastic a change.").
127. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the Court narrowed its
holding slightly, to protecting the public from "imminent and identifiable harm," as opposed
to future harm or environmental violations that were speculative in nature. Id. at n.9. The
Court neglected to give any guidance, however, as to how to determine which laws are "reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety," and simply stated that the exception
is a "narrow one" only exacerbating the conflict. See id. at 516 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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opinion as being unsupported by the law and contrary to the goals of
the Code."a
The principal and only independent ground offered-that Congress
codified "well-recognized restrictions of a trustee's abandonment
power"--is particularly unpersuasive. It rests on a misreading of the
three pre-Code cases, the elevation of that misreading into a "wellrecognized" exception to the abandonment power, and the unsupported assertion that Congress must have meant to codify the exception (or something like it).'29
Significantly, Justice Rehnquist analyzed each argument offered
by the majority in support of their position and opined that the
Court's analysis was unsupported and wholly unpersuasive. The majority found that § 554 was meant to codify prior case law, citing
three pre-Code cases. 3 However, the dissent elaborated on these
cases and reasoned that "the majority misapplied the true holdings of
those courts.' 3' Second, the Court relied on 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) as

128. ld.at 507 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 507-08.
130. Id. at 500.
131. Id.at 510. Justice Rehnquist reviewed the three pre-Code cases and found that the
established corollary the majority relies on is not supported by a close reading of those cases:
In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952), the Court of Appeals
held that a trustee could not abandon worthless barges obstructing traffic in Baltimore Harbor when the abandonment would have violated federal law. The Court
concluded that the "judge-made rule [of abandonment] must give way" to "an Act
of Congress in the public interest." Id. at 290. Ottenheimner thus depended on the
need to reconcile a conflict between a judicial gloss on the Bankruptcy Act and
the commands of another federal statute
....
In addition, the Court of Appeals
relied heavily on the fact that the pre-Code law of abandonment was judgemade ....
In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 BCD 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1974) was a Bankruptcy Court decision concluding that the principle of Ottenheimer did not apply
because there was no conflicting statute. But because the right to abandon was
based on judge-made law, the court nonetheless found itself free to protect the
public interest by requiring a trustee seeking abandonment to first spend funds of
the estate to seal manholes and vents in an underground pipe network ....
In In re Chicago Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied sub
nom. Chicago Junction R. Co. v. Sprague, 317 U.S. 683 (1942), the District Court,
sitting in bankruptcy, had authorized the bankrupt to abandon a lease of a rail line,
and a lessor appealed. The bankrupt did not appeal the District Court's imposition
of conditions on the abandonment .. .So while there may be dicta in the Court
of Appeals' opinion that would support some limitation on the power of abandonment, the holding of the case certainly does not. In short, none of these cases
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statutory support for applying a balancing test to § 554.132 Here,

Justice Rehnquist criticized how unpersuasive § 959(b) is to liquidation cases. Finally, the Court attempted to read a qualification
into § 554 since environmental objectives were elevated elsewhere in

the Code.33 Even here, Justice Rehnquist evinced: "We have previously expressed our unwillingness to read into unqualified statutory

language exceptions or limitations based upon legislative history unless that legislative history demonstrates with extraordinary clarity that

this was indeed the intent of Congress.'

135

Accordingly, "Congress's

failure to so qualify section 554 [suggests] that it intended the relevant inquiry at an abandonment hearing to be limited to whether the
property is burdensome and of inconsequential value to the estate.""'36 Therefore, he reasoned, the absence of such provisions in

§ 554 indicates Congress had no intention to so restrict the trustee's
power. 7 Moreover, disallowing abandonment and forcing a cleanup
would effectively place the environmental statutes' interests in protecting the public ahead of the claims of other creditors. 3 It is axiomatic that Congress did not intend "section 554 abandonment hear-

support the Court's view that § 554(a) contains an explicit exception for "certain
state and local laws."
I&. at 510-12.
132. Id. at 505.
133. Id. at 514; see also Alabama Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re
N.P. Mining Co.), 963 F.2d 1449 (l1th Cir. 1992) (maintaining assets of estate for later distribution is not "managing or operating" property within purview of § 959(b)); In re Corona
Plastics, 99 B.R. 231 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1989) (holding § 959(b) not applicable where trustee or
debtor in possession is only liquidating estate); In re Microfab, Inc. 105 B.R. 161 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1989) (following Walker v. Maury County (In re Scott Hous. Sys.), 91 B.R. 190
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988)); Walker, 91 B.R. 190; In re Security Gas & Oil Co. 70 B.R. 786
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987). But see In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co., 831 F.2d 118 (6th
Cir. 1987) (holding § 959(b) applicable in context of public's welfare, regardless of trustee's
status as liquidator or reorganizer); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987)
(holding that chapter 7 trustee must comply with § 959(b)).
134. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1993).
135. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 510 (Rehnquist J., dissenting) (citing Garcia v. United States,
469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984)); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1170(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (holding
that abandonment of railroad lines permitted only if "consistent with the public interest").
136. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Kong, supra note 75,
at 228 (noting that the clear statutory language of § 554 indicates bankruptcy court should
undertake a "cost-benefit analysis").
137. Justice Rehnquist points out that nowhere in the legislative history does it suggest
"Congress intended to limit the trustee's authority to abandon burdensome property where
abandonment might be opposed by those charged with the exercise of state police or regulatory power." Id.
138. Id. at 516 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ings... [to]139be used to establish the priority of particular claims in
bankruptcy."'

A. The Effect of Midlantic
Several decisions following the Supreme Court's decision in
Midlantic have emphasized that the Court did not intend to strictly
preclude abandonment of property whenever state environmental laws
and regulations would be violated."4 In a well-reasoned opinion, the
bankruptcy court in In re Franklin Signal Corp.,4 professed that
"the Supreme Court intended only to place limits on a trustee's power
of abandonment by holding that the bankruptcy court cannot authorize

abandonment of property in contraveition of state law unless conditions are formulated that will adequately protect the public health and
safety."' 42 However, ironic as it may be, the Supreme Court failed
to direct courts as to what conditions should be utilized in evaluating
a trustee's attempt to abandon contaminated property. Taking the bull

139. l at 517 (Rehnquist, 3., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist noted that he "appreciate[s]
the Court's concern that abandonment may aggravat[e] already existing dangers by halting
security measures that preven[t] public entry, vandalism, and fire." Id. at 515 (quoting
Midlanic, 474 U.S, at 498, n.3). However, Justice Rehnquist agreed with the bankruptcy
court that "[t]he City and State are in a better position in every respect than either the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be done to protect the public against the dangers posed by" a contaminated facility. Id. at 515.
140. A number of courts have permitted abandonment when asked by a trustee to abandon contaminated property, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's directive in Midlantic, See,
e.g., In re L.F. Jennings Oil Co., 4 F.3d 887, 890 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that abandonment was not improper because no imminent harm to public health); In re Smith-Douglass,
Inc., 856 F.2d 12, 16 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that a debtor only needs to eliminate inminent harm to be able to abandon); In re H.F. Radandt, Inc., 160 B.R. 323, 328 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1993) (allowing abandonment because state failed to show imminent danger and had
taken no remedial action); In re Better-Brite Plating, 105 B.R. 912, 917 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
1989) (holding that abandonment is allowed if no imminent harm and no unencumbered
assets available to fund cleanup); In re FCX, 96 B.R. 49, 54-55 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989)
(holding that abandonment allowed if there is no immediate harm); In re Brio Ref., 86 B.R.
487, 489 (Bankr. N.D.Tex. 1988) (finding no restriction on abandonment if environmental
problems unknown at time of abandonment); In re Purco, Inc., 76 B.R. 523, 532-22 (Bankr.
W.D. Penn. 1987) (holding that abandonment is permitted if no imminent harm); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 272 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) (holding that abandonment is
allowed if no imminent danger to public); In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 B.R. 562, 565
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986) (holding that abandonment is permitted since no imminent harm);
In re Pierce Coal and Constr., 65 B.R. 521, 528 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986) (holding that
abandonment is permitted if no imminent harm); see also WENTRAUB & RESNICK supra note
85, 4.06.
141. 65 B.R. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
142. Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
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by the homs, so to speak, something the Supreme Court apparently
did not feel a need to do, the bankruptcy court in Franklin Signal

proposed a balancing test to weigh the competing interests of environmental protection and the Bankruptcy Code.'" The court posited
five factors to be considered in determining whether hazardous waste

may be abandoned in violation of state law:1" (1) The imminence
of danger to the public health and safety; (2) the extent of the probable harm; (3) the amount and type of hazardous waste; (4) the cost to
bring the property into compliance with environmental laws; and (5)

the amount and type of funds available for cleanup.'45 Despite violations of Wisconsin environmental laws, the court held that the trustee

could abandon fourteen drums of hazardous waste.'" Similarly, the
Fourth Circuit has refused to impose the Midlantic duty to cleanup
polluted assets before abandonment where the estate does not have
any unencumbered assets.'47 In Smith-Douglass, the court permitted

143. Id. at 272.
144. Although there is no set answer to what conditions should be formulated, the court
believed that these five factors should be considered. Consequently, considering these factors
in setting the conditions for abandonment will effectively balance the competing interests. Id.
at 272.
145. Id. at 272. In a footnote, the court stressed how a strict application of Midlantic to
preclude abandonment in all cases in which state environmental laws are violated could lead
to illogical results if the cost of compliance is greater than available funds:
In some cases, a strict application of the Midlantic holding is not practical,
or even possible. For example, in a Chapter 7 no-asset case the trustee is rendered
helpless. On the one hand, the trustee has no funds-secured or unsecured-to pay
for the hazardous waste cleanup. On the other hand, the court cannot authorize an
abandonment under § 554(a) if it would contravene state environmental laws. The
ironic quirk in a strict application of Midlantic is that the property would ultimately be abandoned by default pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) . . . . Because a strict
application of Midlantic would simply side-step the problem, it is entirely logical
to conclude that the majority did not intend such a result.
Id. at 272 n.5 (citation omitted).
146. The court elaborated:
Even though the drums are in a deteriorating condition, they are not a threat to
public safety. The State of Wisconsin has been informed of the situation from the
outset, and has not found it necessary to take any further precautionary measures.
Even if Midlantic dictates complete compliance with state law, the trustee would
not have the requisite funds. The estate currently has $10,000 in unencumbered
cash. The trustee already has spent $500 of estate funds for the environmental
report, and it would cost approximately $20,000 for the initial cleanup. Under the
circumstances, an abandonment is appropriate.
Id. at 274.
147. In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1988); see also supra note
141. The court in In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 B.R. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986) rejected
a strict reading of Midlantic and professed the bankruptcy court need only "take environmental laws and regulations into consideration." Id. at 565.
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the trustee to unconditionally abandon the plant irrespective of the

fact that the facility violated state
regulations."

environmental

laws and

Moreover, several courts have recognized the futility

of administering estates burdened by environmentally contaminated
property, thus dismissing the bankruptcy cases due to the estate's
inability to remedy the environmental violations49
On the contrary, not every court disagrees with a strict application of Midlantic 50 In In re Peerless Plating Co.," the bankruptcy court rejected the reasoning of the Franklin Signal' decision
and held that the trustee could not abandon property with less than

full compliance with CERCLA." The court reasoned that a trustee
may not abandon a hazardous waste site in violation of an environmental law unless: (1) the environmental law is "so onerous as to
"' (2) the environinterfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself'; 54

148. Smith-Douglass, 856 F.2d at 17. This decision was conditioned by the EPA's failure
to pursue enforcement, indicating the plant did not present any imminent harm or danger to
the public. Id. at 16. The court also held the financial condition of the debtor is relevant to
the Midlantic analysis as here, the debtor had no unencumbered assets to finance a cleanup.
Id. at 17. Another consideration for the Smith-Douglass court was that the polluted property
did not pose a serious health risk. "We affirm the finding that unconditional abandonment
was appropriate in light of the estate's lack of unencumbered assets, coupled with the absence of serious public health risks posed by the conditions in this case." Id. To the extent
the court did not have to deal with a situation that posed a serious threat to public health
and safety, its application in these types of cases is limited.
149. See In re 82 Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 B.R. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) (denying the
trustee's abandonment request because the estate did not have sufficient funds to effect a
cleanup and therefore dismissing the case); In re Commercial Oil Serv., 58 B.R. 311 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1986) (dismissing the debtor's chapter 7 case pursuant to section 707(a)), affd 88
B.R. 126 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) ; In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust, 30 B.R.
918 (Bankr. D. Mass 1983) (dismissing the chapter 7 case due to the estate's inability to
remedy ongoing violations of environmental laws.).
150. See In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co., 831 F.2d 118, 122 (6th Cir. 1987)
(holding § 959(b) applies to liquidation trustees and the trustee could not abandon hazardous
property in violation of the State's environmental laws); 82 Milbar Blvd, 91 B.R. at 213
(ordering the trustee to deed property directly to EPA in order to permit EPA to conduct
cleanup operations); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 783-84 (Bankr. D. Me 1987) (flatly refusing
abandonment and, in effect, devoting the entirety of bankrupt estate to funding the expense of
remediation by granting the government an administration expense priority for response costs);
In re Mowbray Eng'g Co., 67 B.R. 34, 35 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986) (holding that the ability
of the trustee to abandon property must yield to government priority to use bankrupt estate's
assets for cleanup of property to protect public health and safety).
151. 70 B.R. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).
152. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
153. Peerless Plating, 70 B.R. at 947-48.
154. Id. at 947. Although the court did not give examples of what conditions would be
"so onerous as to interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself," it indicated that asset
depletion is not such a condition.
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mental law "is not reasonably designed to protect the public health or
safety from identified hazards"" 5 ; or (3) "the violation caused by

abandonment would merely be speculative or indeterminate."'5 6 In
addition, the Sixth Circuit has refused to allow abandonment when no
responsible party is left to remedy the condition." 7 In In re Wall
Tube & Metal Products Co., the Sixth Circuit held that a trustee
could not abandon property if abandonment violates a state environ-

mental statute "designed to protect the public health or safety from
readily identified hazards.' 5 8
VI. BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE PERSONAL LABmrrY
Although no court has held a bankruptcy trustee personally liable

for the debtor's environmental cleanup costs, numerous environmental

laws may impose personal liability for cleanup costs5 9 of preexisting environmental contamination merely on the grounds that the trustee acquired ownership or control of the property. 6" This problem is
compounded, from the trustee's perspective, by the Supreme Court's
directive in Midlantic.6 Under Midlantic, a trustee is not permitted
to abandon contaminated property unless the property is in compliance with state environmental laws. If the chapter 7 trustee does
not have sufficient funds to effect a cleanup of the contaminated
property, the trustee will be prohibited from abandoning such property
and may be held personally liable for the cleanup.
The standard for liability of a bankruptcy trustee was established
by the Supreme Court in Mosser v. Darrow." In Mosser, the Su-

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co., 831 F.2d 118, 118 (6th Cir. 1987).
158. Id. at 122.

159. Although their efforts have failed, state agencies have attempted to hold trustees
personally liable. See, e.g., In re Sundance Corp., 149 B.R. 641 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1993);
In re Better-Brite Plating, 483 N.W.2d 574 (Vis. 1992).
160. See CERCLA, supra note 1, 42 U.S.C. § 9601; see also Arlene E. Mirsky et al.,
The Interface Between Bankruptcy and Environmental Laws, 46 Bus. LAW. 626 (1991).

161. 474 U.S. 494 (1984). See supra notes 113-58 and accompanying text.
162. 474 U.S. 494 (1984).
163. 341 U.S. 267 (1951). In Mosser, a bankruptcy trustee was appointed to reorganize
two bankrupt trusts consisting of two holding companies holding the securities of twentyseven corporations. Id. at 268. The trustee employed two persons to manage the holding
companies and to trade the securities of the corporations held by the trust. Id. at 269. The
two employees made a substantial profit on the trusts by trading to, and for, themselves and
the trusts. Id. Although the Court recognized the trustee's actions were not corrupt, it nonetheless held him personally liable for the amount of profits made by the two employees in
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preme Court upheld the personal liability of a trustee who deliberately

permitted his agents to profit from the trading of securities owned by
the bankrupt estate. However, the Mosser case subsequently gave rise

to a split among the circuits as to the proper standard for bankruptcy
trustee liability."6 In Sherr v. Winkler,65 the Tenth Circuit refused
to impose personal liability on a bankruptcy trustee based on negli-

gent acts and held instead that a trustee is personally liable only for
acts determined to be "willful and deliberate in violation of [the

trustee's] duties."' " Taking a different position, the Ninth Circuit in
In re Cochise College Park, Inc.,67 held that "[a]lthough a trustee is

not liable in any manner for mistakes in judgement where discretion
is allowed, he is subject to personal liability for not only intentional
but also negligent violations of duties imposed upon him by law."'68

Despite the split among the circuits, a bankruptcy trustee can be held
personally liable for intentional and negligent violations of his duties. 69
A. Trustee Liability Under Chapter 7

The potential for personal liability of a bankruptcy trustee in a
case involving contaminated property can arise in a number of ways

under chapter 7. Potential liability could arise where a chapter 7
trustee was operating the debtor's business, and at the same time
generating toxic waste. Unless the trustee properly disposes of the
waste he could face liability under CERCLA § 107(a)(3). 7 Howev-

their self-interested transactions. Id. at 275. The court stated that "[e]quity tolerates in bankruptcy trustees no interest adverse to the trust." Id. at 271.
164. In re Center Teleproductions, 112 B.R. 567, 576 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re
Tucker Freight Lines, 62 B.R. 213, 217 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986).
165. 552 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1977).
166. Id. at 1375.
167. 703 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1983).
168. Id. at 1357 (citations omitted). The court added that a trustee must "exercise that
measure of care and diligence that an ordinary and prudent person under similar circumstances would exercise." Id. at 1357. The Second Circuit has adopted the approach developed by
the Ninth Circuit. See In re Gorski, 766 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1985).
169. In re Center Teleproductions, 112 B.R. 567, 567 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("A trustee
who negligently fails to discover [his] agent's negligence, negligently obtains [a] court order,
or negligently or willfully carries out [a] court order he knew or should have known he
wrongfully procured . . . may be held personally liable.").
170. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1983 & Supp. 1994). Section 107(a)(3) imposes liability on
the generators of toxic waste. Id. Bankruptcy trustees will not be liable under section
107(a)(1) and 107(a)(2), the "owner and operator" sections, because bankruptcy trustees are
exempted from such liability under CERCLA definition of "owner and operator." CERCLA,
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er, since the bankruptcy trustee cannot operate the debtor's business' 7 1 without the approval of the bankruptcy court, the extent to

which the trustee may be liable will depend on the extent to which
the court authorizes the trustee to generate toxic waste.172 By pro-

hibiting abandonment of contaminated property unless in compliance
with state environmental laws, the Supreme Court in Midlantic creat-

ed yet another potential avenue for imposing personal liability on a
bankruptcy trustee. Since bankruptcy does not provide a trustee with a
safe harbor to abandon contaminated property, that trustee who is

forced to continue operating a facility it sought to abandon may find
itself saddled with liability. In the precarious situation in which the

chapter 7 estate has no available funds to effect a cleanup of the
contaminated property," the trustee may be held responsible for the
cleanup of hazardous waste.'74
B. Personal Liability Following Midlantic
Courts interpreting Midlantic have articulated that a bankruptcy
trustee may be personally liable for the cleanup of hazardous waste.

supra note 1, § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). Section 101(20)(A) states in pertinent
part: "[t]he term 'owner or operator' means ...
(iii) in the case of any facility, title or
control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy . . . to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility
immediately beforehand." Id Thus, in the case of bankruptcy, the trustee presumably is precluded from being an owner or operator under CERCLA. Jeffery, supra note 105, at
421 n.93. But see In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 948 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987)
(holding estate would fall within definition of "owner" under CERCLA and be liable for both
pre-petition and post-petition cleanup claims); Douglas M. Garrou, The Potentially Responsible
Trustee: Probable Target for CERCLA Liability, 77 VA. L. REv. 113, 123 (1991) (discussing
the innocent landowner defense).
171. 11 U.S.C. § 721 (1993) (The trustee, with permission of the court, may operate
debtor's business to the extent necessary to liquidate business.).
172. It is doubtful that a bankruptcy court would hold a trustee personally liable for
generating hazardous substances when the bankruptcy court authorized the trustee to do so.
See In re Better-Brite Plating, 105 B.R. 912 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989). However, if a trustee
attempted to generate waste without the permission of the bankruptcy court, personal liability
under both CERCLA and common law for willful or negligent violations of his duties may
be appropriate.
173. Before a bankruptcy trustee will become personally liable, the chapter 7 estate must
have no available source for funds with which to effect a cleanup. This means the estate
must have no unencumbered assets and no uncontaminated assets subject to a security interest. If uncontaminated secured assets exist, the trustee could potentially utilize these funds
under Code § 363(e) and thus avoid personal liability. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1993).
174. See, e.g., In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); In re 82
Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 B.R. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988). For a discussion of personal liability, see infra notes 175-86 and accompanying text.
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In In re 82 Milbar Boulevard, Inc.,75 the bankruptcy court for the

Eastern District of New York recognized that as a result of the
Midlantic decision there is the potential for personal liability of a

chapter 7 trustee.

6

The Bankruptcy Court reviewed the Midlantic

holding and found a flaw in its decision:
The holding in Midlantic implies a duty on the part of the
trustee which is independent of the estate's ability to fund his performance of that duty. This decision, evaluated in conjunction with
(i) the trustee's capacity to "sue and be sued," and (ii) federal, state
and local environmental regulations which do not limit the liability
of a trustee in bankruptcy, threatens to undermine the integrity of
the system heretofore developed for the administration of bankruptcy
cases.rn

Concerned that this potential liability would discourage people from
becoming bankruptcy trustees, the court held that the existence in
the bankruptcy estate of polluted assets which "present an unreasonable risk of liability to the trustee pursuant to environmental legisla-

tion may constitute acceptable cause for resignation of a trustee."'"

175. 91 B.R. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988). The debtor in Milbar was a corporation
whose primary asset was a piece of real estate polluted with toxic wastes. Id. at 214. The
case came before the Bankruptcy Court on a motion by the debtor corporation's trustee to
either dismiss the case pursuant to § 305 of the Code, or to authorize the abandonment of
all of the debtor's assets. Id.
176. Although Midlantic did not specifically address personal liability of a trustee, courts
have implicitly reasoned that such liability may exist as a result of Midlantic. See Better-Brite
Plating, 105 B.R. at 912; Microfab, 105 B.R. at 161; 82 Milbar Blvd., 91 B.R. at 213.
177. 82 Milbar Blvd., 91 B.R. at 218 (citations omitted); see also Jeffery, supra note 105
(discussing bankruptcy trustee personal liability).
178. 82 Milbar Blval, 91 B.R. at 219. The Milbar court was so concerned with finding
trustees would become difficult, that it held the mere presence of a polluted asset was not
sufficient cause to dismiss the case under § 707 of the Code. Id. at 221. The inability to
find a person willing to act as trustee, however, would be cause for such dismissal. Id. The
court also held that should the trustee in the case resign, and "[i]n the event that no interim
or successor trustee is in place as of 30 days from the date 'of this Memorandum Decision,
the absence of an appointed trustee shall be cause for dismissal pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707

(a)." Id. at 214.
179. 82 Milbar Blvd., 91 B.R. at 222. Title to the polluted property was ordered to be
kept in the bankruptcy estate with the intention that after cleanup the property would be sold
and the proceeds distributed to the creditors of the estate. Id. at 220. However, possessory
interest in the polluted property was transferred to the EPA. Id.
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Similarly, in the case of In re Microfab, Inc.,"' the bankruptcy
court interpreted the Midlantic decision as imposing the potential for
personal liability on a trustee."' The Microfab court, however,
avoided imposing liability on the trustee by reading an exception into
the Midlantic decision." The court found that a paradox was created by the Supreme Court in Midlantic. Midlantic precludes the trustee
from abandoning polluted assets of the estate without first meeting
However, the
certain federal and state environmental conditions.'
Court in Midlantic failed to articulate or lend any guidance as to
what those conditions may be.'84 Realizing the paradox, the Bankruptcy Court responded that a trustee is not obligated to expend assets
of the estate to cleanup a site where the estate "does not have sufficient resources to achieve appreciable results. ' ' " In essence, the exception delineated by the court relieved the trustee of the responsibility of blindly expending all personal and estate assets in a futile cleanup effort."'s
C. Dismissal
As a result of the compromising tension between environmental
law and the trustee's obligations under the Code, courts and trustees
have adopted several approaches for resolving this issue. Probably the
safest approach, from the trustee's perspective, would be to get the
case dismissed without appointment of a trustee. In In re Charles
George Land Reclamation Trust,' the U.S. Trustee brought an
emergency motion for dismissal of a waste disposal facility.' The

180. 105 B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). The State of Massachusetts sought an injunc-

tion to force the chapter 7 trustee to clean up the contaminated property of the estate. Id. at
162. However, the estate had insufficient funds to clean up the property: $750,000 of unen-

cumbered cash, but an estimated cleanup cost between $1.6 and $1.9 million. Id. at 164.
181. Id. at 168.
182. Id.
183. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501

(1986).
184. In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 161, 168 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); see also In re
Paris Indus. Corp., 106 B.R. 339, 342 (Bankr. D. Me. 1989) (referring to the paradox that
Midlantic requires cleanup but fails to identify a viable funding source).
185. Microfab, 105 B.R. at 166. But see In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 948-49

(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) ("As the estate could not avoid the consequent liability by abandonment
estate in
186.
187.

in this case, the Trustee had a duty to expend all the unencumbered assets of the
remedying the situation, as required by Midlanuic.').
Microfab, 105 B.R. at 166.
30 B.R. 918 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983).

188. Id. at 919.
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court noted at the time of the hearing that "it became apparent that
the U.S. Trustee would be called upon to serve as chapter 7 trustee
of this estate as no member of the panel of private trustees was willing to assume the responsibilities of this estate.' 89 As a result, the
court dismissed the case because it was impossible for any trustee to
manage the debtor's site in compliance with state law and thus meet
the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 959(b). 9
Similarly, the Bankruptcy Court in Mattiace Industries, Inc.
followed the same direction. The court reasoned that "the boundaries
of the trustee's duties and scope of liability in this type of case remain potentially unlimited and untested."'" Relying on the Supreme
Court's holding in Midlantic, the court stated that "the trustee has an
affirmative duty to clean up the site and comply with State laws."'93
As a result, the court dismissed the debtor's chapter 11 petition rather
than converting the case to one under chapter 7 and appointing a
94
trustee.
D. An Envirotek Letter
Another approach for trustees seeking a limit on personal liability
is to obtain an "Envirotek" letter from the EPA. In In re Envirotek,
Ltd.,'95 the U.S. Trustee was unable to find a qualified trustee to
administer the debtor's estate. Consequently, the U.S. Trustee's office
obtained a letter from the Department of Justice, Land and Natural
Resources Division, which stated that "[the] United States will not
seek to hold a chapter 7 trustee appointed [in the case] personally
liable for any civil claims for hazardous waste cleanup costs so long
as the trustee in administering the estate does not act in any manner
that causes or contributes to environmental harm."''
In addition,
trustees have attempted to obtain orders from the bankruptcy court
relieving the trustee from personal liability."9 However, it is impor189. Id. at 921.
190. Id. at 922-23.
191. 76 B.R. 44 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987).
192. Id. at 47.
193. Id.; see also Commercial Oil Serv., 58 B.R. 311, 317 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986)
(dismissing the chapter 7 case rather than subjecting the trustee to risks of environmental
cleanup).
194. Mattiace, 76 B.R. at 48.
195. Case No. 89-10222-M (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1989). The case was subsequently settled.
196. Davis Gardner & Mary Sommerville, Bankruptcy Trustee's Personal Liability for
Debtor's Violation of Hazardous Waste Laws, 67 FLA. BAR J. 44, 45 (1993).
197. See In re Transcon Lines, 121 B.R. 837 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (chapter 7 trustee
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tant to recognize that an "Envirotek Letter or consent decree with the
EPA does not estop state regulatory agencies which also might have
19
jurisdiction to assert claims against the trustee.""
Whatever the result, it remains apparent that courts are struggling
to determine the extent of liability incurred by a trustee. What remains clear, however, is the potential for personal liability on a bankruptcy trustee, especially following the limitation on its abandonment
powers by the Supreme Court.
E. Public Policy Concerns
There are important public policy concerns which stem from a
Midlantic-type situation. The inability of the trustee to abandon a
toxic waste site will force the trustee, who in most instances does not
have the necessary expertise, to effect a cleanup or to solve complex
environmental and scientific questions.1 Indeed, it makes more
sense to impose the duty to clean up the site on the state and federal
environmental agencies which have the necessary expertise.2 "u Allowing the state and federal agencies to have a "super-priority" lien
on the contaminated property would give such agencies the opportunity to recover some cleanup costs before other creditors."
Abuse of the Bankruptcy Code by industrial polluters not only
thwarts federal and state policies, but threatens the public welfare. A
legislative solution is the proper response. Although the federal bankruptcy law may not be the proper -vehicle for direct implementation of
environmental protection objectives,' Congress has previously been
willing to amend the Code to eliminate abuse and accommodate public interests. 3

granted summary judgment relieving him of personal liability except for his intentional acts
or failure to act); French v. Mississippi Dep't of Natural Resources (In re Somers Corp.),
Case No. 1-89-02294 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991) (trustee obtained order from court relieving
him of personal liability except for his intentional acts); United States v. Envtl. Conservation
Chem. Corp., Case No. IP-83-1419C (S.D. Ind. 1991) (holding that superfund consent decree
limited trustee's personal liability to "bad faith").
198. Gardner & Sommerville, supra note 196, at 45.
199. See Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 103, at 70.
200. See, e.g., In re 82 Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 B.R. 213, 214 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988).
201. See, e.g., In re Better-Brite Plating, 105 B.R. 912, 919 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989).
202. See, e.g., Silber, supra note 111.

203. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984). In response to the Supreme Court's holding, Congress enacted a limited exception to § 365(a) for union contracts.
In Bildisco, the Court allowed the debtor to reject its collective bargaining agreement and
continue to operate its business as a debtor in possession. Consequently, congressional and
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CONCLUSION

The issues and equities relating to the abandonment of contaminated property have been the subject of a great deal of research and

comment. 2° As the estate's representative, a trustee2°5 must
achieve an equitable distribution of the estate through liquidation (or,
occasionally, a plan of reorganization). To reach this goal, the trustee
strives to maximize the value of the estate. While this attempt at
maximization often justifies the actual gathering and preservation of
the debtor's property, under certain circumstances, the minimal or

non-existent value of a particular property would not be enhanced
despite the trustee's efforts and the incurrence of the costs arising
from his actions. Accordingly, the Code permits the trustee to aban-

don property that is "burdensome" or of "inconsequential value" to
the estate."

However, a trustee's broad power to abandon property

that is burdensome or worthless may be restricted if the abandonment
of such property may cause harm to the public health and safety.2"
Although the Court appears to have restricted the trustee's abandonment authority, many courts are still puzzled by Midlantic's holding
and have been busy distinguishing it ever since."' Midlantic failed
to resolve some issues, many of which were raised by the dissent.
First, the Court acknowledged that it was not addressing the

question of whether certain state laws imposing conditions on aban-

public dissatisfaction led to the passage of the union contract exception. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 541(a), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(98 Stat.) 353, 390 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1113); see also N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23, 1984, at Al, col. 3; Congress Approves Bankruptcy Bill with Compromise Labor Law
Provision, 11 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 911 (July 9, 1984).
204. See Thomas G. Gruenert, Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy: Policy Conflicts,
ProceduralPitfalls and ProblematicPrecedent, 32 S. TEx. LJ. 399 (1991); Sandra G. Soneff
Redmond, Abandonment Rights under Section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code: Midlantic Nat'l
Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 40 Sw. LJ. 1103 (1986) (discussing development of abandonments power); Darlene Echols, Comment, Bankruptcy, Hazardous Waste and
Mass Tort: A Top Priority Review, 23 Hous. L. REv. 1243 (1986) (discussing danger of
corporations filing bankruptcy instead of cleaning up hazardous property); Joseph F. LaFleur,
Note, Hazardous Waste Removal, States Court Injunctions, And The Bankruptcy Code: Ohio
v. Kovacs, 54 CIN. L. REV. 1101 (1986) (discussing use of bankruptcy filing to avoid liability for hazardous waste); Kong, supra note 75; Jeffrey, supra note 105; Garrou, supra note
170.
205. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
206. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1993).
207. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 507
(1986).
208. See supra notes 140-58 and accompanying text.
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donment may be so onerous as to interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself. According to the dissent, compliance with states'
environmental laws constituted such interference.
Second, the Court failed to clarify whether abandonment itself
would be barred if there was a genuine emergency or if abandonment
would only "aggravat[e] already existing dangers by halting security
measures that preven[t] public entry, vandalism, and fire."2 0 It is
not therefore clear whether the Court intended to require total cleanup
as a condition to abandonment, as suggested by the dissent, or merely
211
to take reasonable precautions to alleviate any imminent danger.
Third, the Court failed "to identify those laws that it deem[ed]
so reasonably calculated" to protect the public health or safety from
imminent and identifiable harm. 212 However, even if abandonment to
the debtor is permitted, the property revests with a debtor which lacks
assets to fund a cleanup, so the public health or safety is not advanced. Conversely, if abandonment is denied many trustees are hesitant to administer contaminated property for fear of incurring personal
liability for failing to comply with cleanup requirements.213
Fourth, the Court left the pragmatic dilemma unresolved: if abandonment is prohibited, how does a trustee, with inadequate resources
available in the bankrupt's estate, either bring the property in compliance with applicable environmental laws, or, at a minimum, take
reasonable precautions to safeguard the public? At least one court has
suggested the property be abandoned to the environmental agency, as
a party with a "possessory interest" in the property.214 "Once the
agency performs cleanup, the property can be sold and the agency
can recoup its costs from the sales proceeds."2 5"

209. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507.
210. Id. at 499 n.3.
211. Id. at 515-16.
212. Id. at 516.
213. See supra notes 159-86 and accompanying text.
214. In In re 82 Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 B.R. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988), the court entered an order directing conveyance of the estate's possessory interest in the property to the
EPA. By conveying a possessory interest to the EPA, the "EPA could carry out its mandate
under CERCLA." Id. at 220. It should be recognized that the order avoided costly and time
consuming litigation to facilitate cleanup, did not favor the EPA over other creditors, and left
the public safety and welfare at no greater risk upon dismissal.
215. Karynne G. Popper & Alison N. Zim, The Bottomless Pit: The Struggle to Achieve
Judicial Consistency in the Application of CERCLA in Bankruptcy Proceedings, at 687 (PLI
Commentary No. 253, 1994).
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Since Midlantic, the majority of courts that have addressed this
dilemma have permitted abandonment if there is no threat of imminent and identifiable harm to the public health and safety, or if reasonable safeguards are taken to minimize imminent threat. 216 A minority of courts have interpreted Midlantic strictly and expansively,
thus prohibiting abandonment of contaminated property if abandonment would result in a continuing violation of state environmental
laws. 1 7 These courts have failed to analyze the degree and type of
harm, or the imminence of the danger to the public. Contrary to the
Fourth Circuit in Smith-Douglass, recent cases have held that even if
there are unencumbered assets available to cleanup property, abandonment should be permitted under Midlantic if no imminent harm is
threatened, without also requiring the expenditure of unencumbered
funds to remedy the contamination."
Currently, courts are dealing with the problem of trustee liability
in various ways.2 19 While some courts have chosen to ignore the issue, 20 other courts have attempted to reconcile the competing concers of the Code with federal and state environmental laws."'
However, in the midst of this conflict, what remains are inconclusive
and unpersuasive decisions by courts attempting to make sense of the
Supreme Court's decision in Midlantic. Until Congress amends § 554
of the Bankruptcy Code to expressly prohibit or somehow limit abandonment of contaminated property, the bankruptcy courts will continue to struggle with how to condition abandonment to protect the
public while preventing the diminution of the estate's assets and
fostering reorganization.
Joseph S. Maniscalco

216. See supra notes 140-49 and accompanying
217. See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying
218. See, e.g., In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R.
Blvd., 92 B.R. at 213.
219. See In re Hemingway Transp., 105 B.R.
Blvd., 91 B.R. at 213; In re Peerless Plating Co.,

text.
text.
161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); 82 Milbar
171 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); 82 Milbar
70 B.R. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).

For a discussion relating to the different interpretations among the courts with respect to
trustee personal liability, see supra notes 175-86 and accompanying text.
220. See In re Hemingway Transp., 73 B.R. 494 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987).
221. See In re Paris Indus. Corp., 106 B.R. 339 (Bankr. D. Me. 1989); Microfab, 105
B.R. at 161; 82 Milbar Blvd., 91 B.R. at 213.
* The author expresses his gratitude to Professors William R. Ginsberg and Norman I.

Silber for their time and valued criticism, to Janet F. Brunell, Esq., for inspiring me to write
this Note, to his family for their love and support, and to Lisa Scully for her unending encouragement.
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